Purpose of the study: To explore in detail the terror of the period of the first Russian revolution in the assessment of British diplomats during the revolution of 1905-1907.
INTRODUCTION
Russian and Western historians studied the revolutionary movement in Russia in-depth but overlooked the history of terror. Most historians focused their attention on terror in the revolutionary period from 1905-1907 until the end of the 1920s. Traditionally, Soviet historians did not treat revolutionary terror as an independent research problem. In addition, many archival sources were not available to researchers. Soviet historians who studied revolutionary parties and public thought in Russia in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries only briefly touched upon the problem of terror (Gusev, 1963; Gusev, 1975; Levin, 1974; Pokrovsky, 1924 ) devoting most of their attention to the Narodniks, not the revolutionaries of the early 20th century (Vilenskaya, 1965; Sedov, 1966; Troitsky, 1979; Gerasimov, 1991; Budnitsky, 1996; Savinkov, 1991; Rozanov, 2005; Savin, 2001 ).
Since the late 80's of the 20th century the historiographical focus shifted. New archival materials and memoirs provided new information on the history of terror in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. Most researchers conclude that there is a significant difference between the Narodniks and the terrorists of the early 20th century (Bagdasaryan&Bakayev, 2004; Bakayev, 2006; Sukhova, 2012) .
Many English-speaking historians (Laqueur, 1979; Naimark, 1990) contributed to the study of Russian terror. One of them is A. Geifman who demonstrated the scale and role of revolutionary terror in the social and political life of the Russian Empire of the late 19th-early 20th centuries (Geifman, 1997) .
Our research draws from the documents of the British National Archive and the Russian State Historical Archive (fund: 1276  Office of the Council of Ministers). The British National Archive contains the reports to British Foreign Minister Edward Grey from ambassadors, embassy staff, and consuls from Moscow, Batumi, Warsaw, Riga and other cities of the Russian empire. We also examine the periodic Russian press of the time, memoirs, stenographic reports of the First and Second State Dumas considering them as important sources for studying the public reaction to terror.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The British diplomats' views on terror in the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century have never been the subject of specific research despite the fact that there are many works the British diplomatic corps in the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century (Hughes, 2000; Neilson, 1987; Nicolson, 1937) .
The British National Archive contains the reports to British Foreign Minister Edward Grey from ambassadors, embassy staff, and consuls from Moscow, Batumi, Warsaw, Riga and other cities of the Russian empire. We also examine the periodic Russian press of the time, memoirs, stenographic reports of the First and Second State Dumas considering them as important sources for studying the public reaction to terror. The article employs chronological, historical-typological, historical-genetic, comparative and illustrative research methods, as well as systematic analysis and synthesis. The chronological scope of the research covers 1905-1907, the period when revolutionary terror in Russia reached its peak. The historical-typological method is employed to analyze and describe the Russian public, legislative and executive attitudes to revolutionary terror. The historical-genetic method is most consistent with the principle of historicism. It helps to identify the causes and consequences of revolutionary terror in Russia and to explain the negative perception of terror by British diplomats. The comparative method is used to compare the number of terrorist attacks in the Russian Empire before the State Duma, during its work, and after its dissolution. The method of analysis and synthesis allows understanding the peculiarities of the reaction to revolutionary terror by British diplomats in the context of Russo-British relations of the early 20th century. The historical-systemic approach helps to examine how the Russian terror of 1905-1907 influenced the political system of the Russian empire.
It is worthwhile to compare the British views on terror with the views of Russian liberals, especially the Cadets, who admired the British constitutional order. Many Russian liberals were friendly with British diplomats and provided them with information.
In addition, the Russian revolutionary events coincided with the attempts to bring Russia and Britain closer: the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907. British diplomatic correspondence reveals how much Britain was interested in the agreement with Russia and how much this revolutionary terror influenced the negotiation process.
TERROR AS A METHOD OF REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE AGAINST AUTHORITIES (1905-1907)
Revolutionary (or political) terror is an established term in the historiography of the liberation movement in Russia. This method of struggle was used by the left parties before the revolution of 1905-1907, during and after the revolution. It was of a personified nature, was directed primarily against officials of the Empire with the aim of intimidating the authorities and society. Thus, it was different from other methods of struggle of revolutionaries with power: armed rebellion, strikes, etc.
In the middle of the war with Japan in 1905 in Russia started a revolution, caused by the incompleteness of the modernization process. The terror became a popular method of the revolutionary fight against authorities. Before the revolution, only the Socialist-Revolutionaries (SR) resorted to terror. Expelled from the Yuryev University for political activism, P. Karpovich became the first terrorist who claimed his affiliation with the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. On February 4, 1901, he shot the Minister of Public Education N. Bogolepov, who introduced the "Provisional Rules" in educational institutions and allowed to send the participants of student riots to serve in the army as soldiers. The Combat Section of the Socialist-Revolutionaries began to operate since June 1901. In its program documents, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party justified the necessity of terror and its goals (Gusev, 1992) .
Before the revolution, the Social Democrats criticized the Socialist-Revolutionaries' terror tactics (Lenin, 1967; Plekhanov, 1923) . From the Marxist point of view, terror breaks the connection between revolutionary organizations and the masses (Lenin, 1967) and tarnishes revolutionary fighting (Lenin, 1966) . However, the Social Democrats never rejected the idea of terror and called it "a military action that can be quite useful and even necessary at a certain moment of the fight" (Lenin, 1967) . During the revolution of 1905-1907, the Russian Marxists believed that the time for terror had come. They began to see it as an expression of a people's struggle and explain it in military terms.
Terror literally swept the Russian Empire during the revolution. According to police statistics, the number of terrorist acts in 1907 reached 3,487 (Leonov, 1997) .
Terror became a part of Russian everyday life, and even children played in terrorists. According to A. Geifman, about 22% of all terrorist Socialist-Revolutionaries belonged to the age group from 15 to 19 years and 45% -from 20 to 24. A combat section consisting of students, who were members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, was organized in Bialystok in 1905. Many young people aged under 14 years joined the anarchists Portnyagina, 2015; Portnyagina, 2015; Portnyagina, 2013; Portnyagina&Patrikeeva, 2016) .
PUBLIC REACTION TO TERROR
Surprisingly, despite the spread of terror in the Russian Empire a significant part of the Russian public did not condemn it. the right and Octobrist press (Portnyagina, 2014) expressed condemning views, the leftists and liberals justified terror. The left and left-liberal public not only did not condemn the terror but tried to use it in the fight against power . Most Cadets supported the opinion of the lawyer N. Teslenko: "We do not sympathize with their tactics, but we can use the results and set a fire of revolution" (Protocols of the Central Committee and foreign groups of the Constitutional Democratic Party, 1994). N. Gredeskul summarized the Cadets' attitude to terror: he insisted that the party should consider terror not in moral, but exclusively in political terms. For him, terror was rightful (Gredeskul, 1906) .
THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND TERROR
Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews eISSN: 2395-6518, Vol 7, No 5, 2019 As more and more terrorist attacks targeted public authorities, fear overwhelmed Russian officials many of whom resigned or asked for a transfer. Penza governor S. Khvostov was transferred to St. Petersburg (Koshko, 1916) , but by an ironic twist of fate, he was killed by terrorists in the explosion at P. Stolypin's dacha in August 1906.
Terrorist threats affected the work of parliamentary sessions. For example, on May 26, 1907 , the meeting of the Council of State was postponed to May 30 because of terrorist threats (Witte, 1994) .
The Russian authorities faced two primary challenges: 1) to ensure the safety of officials; 2) to deal with terror in order to stop the revolution. Even the first Prime Minister S. Witte was afraid of terrorists. In the opinion of the statesman V. Gurko, S. Witte flirted with the liberals, criticized the Minister of Internal Affairs P. Durnovo, and expressed the "unbalanced confusion" in 1905-1906 because he wanted "to ensure his security" (Gurko, 2000) . (Portnyagina, 2015) . Journalists defined terror as "an insurgency of revolutionaries against the government" (Rossiya, 1906, August 5), and called for public support (Rossiya, 1906, July 20) .
Thus, the executive branch of Russia considered terror a dangerous anti-state phenomenon, which should be combated with repression and the creation in the country of public opinion hostile to it. Government newspapers created by S. Witte and P. Stolypin became one of the few publications that actively fought against revolutionary terror. However, fear of terror, the desire to use it for personal purposes, prevented S. Witte and his cabinet from successfully resisting this formidable phenomenon. Only P. Stolypin, applying measures unpopular among the liberal public, the military courts, at the same time as the reforms, was able to cope with terror.
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND TERROR
For the First and Second State Dumas, the problem of terror became a central question. Duma's failure to condemn revolutionary terror contributed to the dissolution of parliament. While the right-wing deputies proposed to condemn terror (Portnyagina, 2015) , they lacked the Cadet faction's support. In their speeches, the Cadets glorified revolutionary terror as heroism. Compared to deputies in Dumas, the State Council took a balanced position. The State Council of the First Duma condemned terror but advocated for amnesty and a partial abolition of the death penalty.
BRITISH DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN RUSSIA
British diplomats closely followed the political situation in Russia during the revolution of 1905-1907. At the time the British Foreign Office had much influence on UK foreign policy as the British ambassadors worked closely with the British Foreign Secretary on all foreign policy issues (Hughes, 2000) . In 1904-1906 Charles Hardinge was British Ambassador to Russia. He was interested in improving the Anglo-Russian relations, which deteriorated during the Russo-Japanese War (Hughes, 2000) . He was the first to report and provide the first description of the revolution in Russia to the British authorities. At the time British diplomacy pursued a vital task of signing an agreement with Russia, supported by the British Foreign Secretary Ed. Grey and Ch. Hardinge. The British elites perceived Russia as a "ruthless and barbarous autocratic State, denying all liberties to her subjects and employing the cruelest methods in the suppression of freedom of speech and indeed of thought" (Nicolson, 1937) . The British press sharply reacted to the dissolution of the First State Duma.
British diplomats faced many challenges. The diplomatic corps was small. The diplomats could not obtain information from provinces. Also, they had to avoid causing the displeasure of the tsarist ministers. When the French Ambassador M. Bompard showed too much interest in the Cadet Party, he enraged the emperor who demanded his removal (Nicolson, 1937) . Therefore A. Nicolson was reluctant to encourage his employees' friendship with Duma deputies (Nicolson, 1937) .
Ch. Hardinge reorganized the British consular service to improve the collection of information. He requested the consuls in provinces to report on the socio-political situation in Russia (Nicolson, 1937) . Many experts on Russia including E. J. Dillon who was a correspondent of the Daily Telegraph helped Nicolson. Nicolson was the British Liberal, and he first expressed sympathy for the Duma (Nicolson, 1937) . However, after studying the socio-political situation in Russia, A. Nicolson changed his views on the Russian parliament and liberal parties.
British diplomats understood that the treaty between Russia and Britain was possible under the moderate Duma and the end of the revolution. According to A. Nicolson, Stolypin's reforms could stop the revolution and create the prerequisites for the successful negotiations on the treaty (Nicolson, 1937) . His interest in the treaty largely predetermined the attitude of the new ambassador to the events in Russia in 1906-1907.
TERROR AGAINST BRITISH NATIONALS LIVING IN RUSSIA
In revolutionary Russia, terror affected everybody: Russian and foreign citizens. In July 1906, terrorist attacks were carried out twice near the apartment of the British Consul General A. Murray in Warsaw. The attacks targeted the general and the chairman of the military court, who sentenced seven revolutionaries. Even though the names of military court members were kept in secret, terrorists learned their identities from those in lower ranks, papers, former convicts, etc. (Polyansky, 1934) . The general was severely wounded while his wife was killed. In Jousofka on August 16, 1906, the assistant chief engineer of the company "New Russian Company's Works" Glass William Chambers was wounded. He was targeted because he testified against the terrorist workers.
Explaining why the police investigation was so sluggish, A. Medhurst wrote to Ed. Grey that the Jousofka's police "appear to be terrorized" because many terrorists go on bail and local authorities did not support the police. After the intervention of British diplomats and the Russian government, the investigation proceeded. British Consul who wrote to Ed. Grey: «the number of arrests made and the energy displayed has caused a great impression <…> the people now see that it is dangerous work trying to kill Britishers» (Consul Medhurst to Edward Grey. Rostov on Don, no. 29761). The police arrested a terrorist named Romanenko who attempted at W. Chambers' life and the Consul was present at his interrogation.
According to V. Ermakov, during the revolution of 1905-1907 among 300 anarchists there were63% of workers, 11% of employees, 17% of students, and 3% belonged to the intelligentsia (Rublev, 2010) . On May 28, 1906 , the new British ambassador to Russia A. Nicolson arrived.
BRITISH DIPLOMATS' VIEWS ON TERROR
Terror became a central topic in the reports of British diplomats. The consuls described numerous terrorist attacks in Russian provinces. Consul in Riga A. Woodhouse wrote to Ed. Grey about a sweeping terror in the Baltic provinces at the end of 1906 (Consul-General Smith to Sir E. Grey. Odessa, no.1621). Diplomats reflected on the changed nature of terror and emphasized the fact that the revolutionary parties lost control over it. They noted that criminals often resorted to terror (Consul-General Smith to Sir E. Grey. Odessa, no. 1621). Woodhouse pointed out that before 1905 in the Baltic States terror was directed exclusively against the aristocracy, but at the moment it targeted those «who year ago refused to join the revolutionary party» (Council Woodhouse to Sir Edward Grey, 33967). The SRs had many flying combat detachments and squads, which operated either on the orders of the local SR committees or on their own initiative. In addition, the SR extremists split from the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in early 1906 and turned terror into massacres (Geifman, 1997) . Even the Central Committee of the Social Democratic Party did not control its militants. If the Combat organization of the Socialist-Revolutionaries specialized in political assassinations, the SRs in the provinces were engaged in economic terror when they conducted expropriations. In several reports to Ed. Grey, A. Nicolson described in detail the assassination attempt on P. Stolypin on the Aptekarsky Island, carried out by the Socialist-Revolutionaries on the afternoon of August 12 (25) , 1906. In five reports on the matter, he discussed the problem of terror. The news about the terrorist attack against the Prime Minister arrived at the embassy at about 4 pm. A. Nicolson did not receive any information on this matter from the Russian Foreign Ministry, so he sent his son, who was an embassy official, and the embassy ranger to the residence of P. Stolypin to find out information (Nicolson, 1937) .
Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews eISSN: 2395-6518, Vol 7, No 5, 2019 A. Nicolson did not trust the oppositional Russian press that the number of political murders decreased during the First Duma. He sent a report to London based on the popular Russian newspaper in Russia «NovoyeVremya» that informed that 3 governors-general, 4 vice-governors, 2 colonels, the commandant of Sevastopol and many others were killed during the period of preparation for the First Duma and its first session. According to other publications, 1,421 people were the victims of terror during this period (А. Nicolson to Edward Grey, no. 32934). The data that P. Stolypin received from the Police Department on August 24, 1906 , confirms the data of the newspaper and the British ambassador (Table 1) . 
CHARACTERISTIC OF THE GOVERNMENT FIGHT AGAINST TERROR
British diplomats called for the decisive governmental measures to suppress terrorist attacks (А. Nicolson to Edward Grey, no. 20735). A. Nicolson wrote to the British Foreign Secretary in September 1906: «In the present circumstances a firm and decided policy on the part of the Government is necessary. … To ensure a victory over the revolutionary movement such measures (summary court-martials) are inevitable» (А. Nicolson to Edward Grey, no. 31324). In a detailed report addressed to Ed. Grey, A. Nicolson described the internal situation in Russia in 1906. He wrote that Stolypin's plan of the simultaneous suppression of revolutionary unrest and the implementation of reforms was reasonable: «I do not think that M. Stolypin can be blamed for the measures which he has taken» (A. Nicolson to Edward Grey, no. 571).
The Ambassador was impressed that the Prime Minister acted against terror not only by force but also by reforms. The program of reforms for the Second Duma A. Nicolson called «a long and remarkable document», and expressed fear «that a skeptical and critical attitude will be adopted by the opposition press» (A. Nicolson to Edward Grey, no. 571).
In his report from the beginning of 1907 A. Nicolson wrote about the Russian Prime Minister: «…he is an honest, straightforward and exceedingly hard-working man and of iron nerves. He sincerely anxious, in the interests of his country, to introduce reforms of a liberal character» (A. Nicolson to Edward Grey, no. 573). A. Nicolson was aware of Stolypin's difficult situation: the Prime Minister was criticized in Russia from left and right. After Stolypin's assassination, A. Nicolson wrote in his diary: «Stolypin was a great man, <…> the most notable figure in Europe» (Nicolson, 1937) . At the same time, he had conflicting views on military field courts.
The British consul from Batumi had an interesting opinion on the government's policy regarding terror. In his view, the government's strict measures against the revolutionaries and the dissolution of the First Duma encouraged terror in retaliation. He advised abandoning «the present repressionary regime … in favor of Parliamentary Government» (Consul Stevens to Edward Grey, no. 29155). However, on November 3, 1906, he wrote that in Batumi the regime of military courts had led to a «lull» (Consul Stevens to Edward Grey, no. 38045).
CONCLUSION
During the revolution of 1905-1907 terror swept across Russia turning into a disaster for the government. In the First and Second Duma, the Cadets blocked the statement condemning terror despite the efforts of right-wing deputies. The governments of S. Witte and P. Stolypin fought against terror by using repressive measures and influencing public opinion on terror. Terror interfered with the lives of not only Russian citizens, but also British subjects. British specialists in Russia and representatives of the diplomatic service suffered from terrorist attacks. Terror complicated relations between the two countries.
An analysis of diplomatic correspondence proved that British diplomats, unlike the Russian left-liberal public, had an extremely negative opinion on revolutionary terror. They understood that terror prevented the development of closer ties between the two countries. The foreign policy treaty called for civil peace in Russia. British diplomats believed then that it was possible to reform Russia constitutionally and did not support revolutionary violence. They welcomed the authorities' actions to suppress terror but blamed the regime's weakness for its spread. The critical assessment of revolutionary terror by British diplomats brought British support to Stolypin's government and contributed to the successful signing of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907.
